Sudanese Communist Party on current situation

More than three years after the outbreak of the devastating war, Sudan has become not merely the scene of a bloody internal conflict but also one of the arenas of the broader geopolitical struggle unfolding across the region. On Sudanese soil, the interests of imperialist and regional powers intersect, with military calculations intertwined with competition for control over resources and the country's strategic location. As the confrontation between the United States and Iran intensifies, accompanied by a reshaping of the balance of power in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, the likelihood increases that Sudan will become even more exposed to projects of foreign influence and intervention.

This comes at a time when the country is suffering unprecedented exhaustion as a result of the war, which has claimed thousands of lives, displaced millions of people, and devastated the country's economic and social infrastructure. This has weakened the state's ability to defend its sovereignty and has opened the way for external powers to treat Sudan as an arena in which to manage their conflicts and pursue their interests, rather than as a sovereign state whose people have the right to determine their own future.

In this context, the meetings held in Nairobi and London reflect a growing tendency to shift the management of the Sudanese crisis outside the country, through political arrangements formulated in foreign capitals rather than emerging from the national will. These initiatives have also been accompanied by attempts to reintroduce the so-called "Ta'sis" ("Foundation") coalition as a partner in the political process, while disregarding the criminal record of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia and the war crimes and widespread violations committed against civilians.

At the same time, there has been a decline in the level of attention paid to Sudan by members of the Quartet—apart from the United States—as they have become increasingly preoccupied with the consequences of the confrontation with Iran and with their differing regional interests. This has left Washington as the actor best positioned to shape the course of international initiatives concerning Sudan. This role does not reflect a genuine commitment to ending the war so much as an effort to manage the crisis in a manner that serves strategic interests and balances of power in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

Accordingly, any settlement imposed from outside will remain constrained by the contradictions among the powers sponsoring it and incapable of addressing the real roots of the crisis. Experience has shown that top-down settlements do not establish lasting peace; rather, they become mechanisms for managing and reproducing conflict. Numerous experiences in Africa demonstrate that foreign interventions have tended to freeze crises rather than resolve them.

Within this framework, U.S. policy appears to combine pressure and incentives in its approach toward the parties to the Sudanese conflict. Economic sanctions are employed as a tool to exert pressure and reshape the balance of power, while political initiatives and transitional arrangements are simultaneously promoted as solutions to the crisis. In reality, however, these initiatives seek to restructure Sudan's political landscape in a manner consistent with the interests of the United States and its allies, rather than reflecting the priorities of the Sudanese people or their right to shape their own future through an independent national will.

The greatest danger confronting Sudan today is not the war alone, but its transformation into a gateway for entrenching foreign tutelage over national decision-making. The longer the conflict continues, the greater the scope for foreign intervention and the deeper the country's dependence on regional and international power blocs, threatening Sudan's unity, sovereignty, and the future of its people.

Real peace will not be created in foreign capitals, nor imposed through sanctions or power-sharing deals among the warring parties. It can only be achieved by the Sudanese people through their independent struggle. A national solution begins with ending the war, rejecting all forms of foreign tutelage and external intervention, and building the broadest possible grassroots front uniting the national and democratic forces committed to the objectives of the December Revolution. This is the path toward achieving fundamental change, restoring national sovereignty, establishing a democratic civilian state based on citizenship and social justice, and safeguarding Sudan's unity, sovereignty, and independence.