Lebanese Communist Party on imperialist aggression in Middle East

Political Report – May 6, 2026 

The American –Zionist Aggression in the International and Regional Framework:

The American –Zionist aggression against Iran, Lebanon, and the countries and peoples of the Middle East constitutes one link in the chain of the project seeking to renew American unilateral hegemony over the world, after the foundations of this hegemony be gan to shake from the beginning of the third millennium.
During this period, features of a radical transition in the structure of the international system emerged, moving from the era of unipolarity (under the leadership of the United States) to patterns of geopolitical chaos tending toward reshaping the global map in unprecedented ways.
This reality was expressed in many indicators, among them: the systematic dismantling by the Trump administration of the network of international alliances, especially Western ones; Washington’s withdrawal from many agreements and international organizatio ns; the collapse of confidence in the U.S. dollar as a result of America’s loss of control over the financial deficit and public debt; in addition to its use of technological development and artificial intelligence as a tool to reinforce the dominance of t he deep state and capital at the expense of the general population.
Profound social phenomena prevail in the United States, bearing witness to a decline in levels of education, a rise in mortality rates, disintegration of the family fabric, widening class gaps, and an absolute flattening of the cultural sphere. The growth of these phenomena is linked to America’s increasing dependence on consumption and imports instead of production and exports, which reflects the decline of industrial capacities in the West generally and in the United States in particular.
This largely explains Washington’s loss of a significant portion of its leadership position in the world as a “guarantor” of international security, and the rush of many regional powers to seek alternatives and alliances outside the American sphere —includi ng encouraging China, which represents the most serious and prominent competitor to American hegemony, as well as Russia and several other international and regional powers, to attempt to fill this vacuum.
Starting from these transformations, it is necessary to read what the United States seeks to achieve of objectives through its current aggression in the Middle East region. In an attempt to gain sufficient time to address the crises of its capitalist syste m, the United States looks forward to renewing and expanding its hegemony over this region, which occupies an important geo - political position, abundant with land and water passages between East and West, and stores youthful human resources and oil and gas  wealth considered the second source of energy in the world after the United States. And the strengthening of American control over the oil and gas markets, their sources, and their routes in the Middle East would enable this country to control
the intense economic competition at the international level, and consequently enhance its chances of winning the political competition and imposing its will on China and the rising powers.
 

1. The U.S. Aggression Against Iran and the Obsession with a Quick Victory:
Our party condemned the American –Zionist aggression against Iran. Trump’s bet was that it would not take more than four days, yet it entered its second month, charged with a discourse of threats and warnings of a war of genocide and of erasing Iranian civi lization and destroying oil installations and stations of energy, electricity, and water desalination. And despite the first strike in which the United States succeeded in assassinating most of the first ‑rank leaders in Iran, including the Morshed (leader)  Ali Khamenei, Iran succeeded in absorbing the effects of this strike, and then proceeded to extend its control over the Strait of Hormuz. And with the escalation of American threats of the necessity of reopening this strait, the two sides agreed that Pakistan would host negotiations between them based on an American proposal of 15 points and an Iranian proposal of 10 points (among them ceasefire – permanent solution with international guarantees – linking the tracks at the level of the region, especially s topping the aggression against Lebanon – restoring rights and lifting sanctions…). And the first round of negotiations ended without agreement, which pushed the American Central Command to impose a blockade on Iran’s ports starting from April 13, to which the Iranian response came: either unified security for all the Gulf ports or none, this coinciding with the increase of disagreement between Lebanon and Iran about separating the track of negotiations, with Lebanon insisting that no one negotiates on behal f of Lebanon except the Lebanese state.
The American aggression left many repercussions, amid the insistence of the American –Zionist side on persisting in escalation, due to its need to achieve a clear image of victory on the eve of the accountability session in Congress in early May regarding t he circumstances of the war decision. This with the note that the image of victory is more than necessary to compensate for the decline of Trump’s popularity and to prevent the Republicans from losing the parliamentary majority in the midterm elections. Am ong the repercussions left by the aggression: the increase of political and popular division inside the United States; the spread of demonstrations and popular protests in America and European countries against the war on Iran; the distancing between Ameri ca and Europe regarding the circumstances of the decision to attack Iran, its objectives and its results, and the refusal of the European Union countries to participate in the war, including in breaking the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz under American c ommand; the marginalization of the institutions of the United Nations and the Security Council as a result of the system of hegemony and bullying led by the United States; the damage to the Gulf states due to their exposure to Iranian bombardment targeting  the American military bases in them, and the failure of these bases to protect those states despite the trillions of dollars invested in the defensive systems… In short, the United States and Israel were not able to topple the Iranian
regime nor to achieve the declared objectives: direct control over the uranium stockpile, subjugating the missile program, ending the ‘proxies,’ and returning the Strait of Hormuz to the situation it was in before the war.

2. Iran Absorbs the “First Strike” Despite Heavy Losses:
The Iranian regime did not collapse as Trump and Netanyahu expected, and Iran managed to turn the battle into a regional confrontation involving Hezbollah and the Popular Mobilization, while imposing unprecedented burdens and costs on the global economic s ystem through the closure of the Strait of Hormuz (which controls 20% of global oil exports). This was in addition to the Houthis’ threat to close Bab al ‑Mandeb (9% of global oil exports). But Iran – aside from the killing and assassination of many of its political and military leaders and civilians – suffered massive direct and indirect losses in state institutions, universities, cultural and scientific centers, and public military, industrial, and civilian facilities, including airports, missile platforms , and manufacturing centers. This reflected a sharp deterioration in living and social conditions, which were already weak and fragile due to pre ‑war inflation, currency collapse, and the evaporation of workers ’ incomes and national savings.
In this context, the Iranian Communist Party (Tudeh) and many leftist, secular, and democratic forces that had participated in the revolution, despite their opposition to the Iranian regime’s repression, took a national stance against the American ‑Zionist aggression on their country. As for negotiations, several possibilities can be listed:
● Progress of negotiations between the United States and Iran reaching the conclusion of an agreement that each of the two parties can market as a victory to its public. This practically requires concessions from both parties and gains for both parties. And in this framework, Iran was able to keep its missile program outside the framework of concessions while showing higher flexibility, meaning suspension of uranium enrichment for a long period (15 years) and concession in some form of its highly enriched sto ck (450 kg enriched at 60%). It holds on to stopping the war against its allies, while issues of frozen funds and political settlements in neighboring countries and others remain linked to the course of the agreement later.
● Stumbling of negotiation and resumption of aggression and fighting for new rounds occurred before returning again to the negotiation table, amid American threat of wide and systematic destruction, specifically targeting sectors of energy, electricity, oil,  and others.
● The United States halts the war unilaterally, declares a symbolic victory, and leaves Iran under sanctions, blockade, and threats.
● Reduction by the United States of the military war in exchange for escalation of the economic and commercial war continued through the comprehensive naval blockade to strangle the Iranian economy and deepen the internal crisis.

3. “Israel” and the Obsession with “Endless War”:
In principle, “Israel” rejected the negotiations from their very foundation, holding on to continuing the war until the overthrow of the Iranian regime, and insisting on separating the two tracks between Lebanon and Iran and on continuing the aggression ag ainst Lebanon even if the war against Iran stops. These declared positions from “Israel” align with its strategy, which at one time had an implicit character and has now become to a large extent declared, openly speaking of its intention to make geopolitic al changes in the maps of the Middle East and of its explicit aspirations for the establishment of a “Greater Israel,” supported in this by the orientations of the American administration in the era of Trump’s second term and by the increasing weight of the far‑right in general in the West.
“Israel” keeps its losses in this war highly secret, but it is likely that these losses are large according to what some international media circles report, based on the magnitude of the number of wounded acknowledged by “Israel” and what is assumed to res ult from that in terms of deaths according to the prevailing international ratios usually between the number of wounded and the number of killed. The losses could have been much higher were it not for what “Israel” possesses of military and technological s uperiority thanks to coordination and direct American support for it, and also what it possesses of normalization agreements with some Gulf states, even if these latter refused to enter directly on its side in the war.
Nevertheless, “Israel” lacks sufficient ground forces to defeat a distant state such as Iran, which has a rich historical civilization and large demographic and geographic capacities.

4- The boundaries of distinction between Iran’s targeting of American bases and its repercussions on Gulf states:
Since the beginning of the war, American military bases located in Gulf states —especially in the Emirates, as well as in Iraq and Jordan —participated in the aggression against Iran and in intercepting its missiles directed toward “Israel.” In return, Iran responded and bombed American military bases and some American oil and industrial installations and companies in Gulf states. The Gulf states and some Arab countries limited themselves to condemning what they considered Iranian aggression against their sov ereignty, but they refused to enter militarily and directly into the war against Iran despite all the political pressures they faced from Trump, which reached the point of personal insult to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
With the failure of negotiations in their first round, the start of the naval blockade on Iran’s ports, and American preparations to forcibly open the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran’s decision to respond
in kind against Gulf ports, the economies of most Gulf states recorded huge losses due to the disruption of their gas and oil export routes and the concentration of a large part of the bombing on their territory without the American army undertaking their protection.
It must be acknowledged that this reality raises major questions about the future course of relations between America and the Gulf states and about the new range of security and political guarantees that the Gulf states will be required to demand, whether from the United States, Europe, or other sponsoring states. On the other hand, this reality raises questions about the outcomes of the deterioration of relations between the Gulf states and Iran. What kind of future relationship should (and can) be establi shed between the two sides? Could such questions open the way for the establishment of a system of “major regional states” —Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Iran, and perhaps Pakistan —that would be capable of providing stability and peace in the region, especia lly for the Gulf states, instead of the continuation of relations of dependency and bilateral and multilateral subordination to the American locomotive that pulls most of these states, albeit to varying degrees and in different forms.

5- Russia and China and the calculation of complex and long ‑term interests:
Russia and China condemned the war on Iran and supported Iran according to the agreements signed with both countries, and they expressed their readiness to play a mediating role. At first glance, the realistic analysis of the Russian and Chinese positions involves a shared interest for them in keeping the United States subject to attrition through its war on Iran —something Trump tried and tries not to be dragged into and not to fall into this trap. The two countries may also bet that what is happening in th e Middle East constitutes an important factor in accelerating the transition from a unipolar international system under the leadership of the United States to a multipolar system in which China plays a fundamental and weighty role, in addition to the roles of other international and regional poles such as Russia, India, European states, and others.
On the other hand, legitimate questions are raised about the extent of Russia’s objective interest in investing the repercussions of the war on Iran as a means to improve its cards in Europe, especially to reduce international and European pressure on it i n the file of the war in Ukraine.
This may also apply to China’s calculations in its pursuit to reduce the level of the high American ceilings in East Asia files.
The aggressive American ‑Zionist policy in the Lebanese framework:
The Zionist enemy went deep in violating the agreement to cease hostilities signed on November 27, 2024, and continued committing aggressions against the Lebanese and the resistance fighters, where the number of martyrs throughout 15 months approached 500 martyrs from our people in the South, the Bekaa, and the Suburb, without any response from the Lebanese state
or from Hezbollah. But the latter initiated a response recently after the assassination of Morshed (leader) Ali Khamenei through a salvo of six rockets.
From the position of our party as the Lebanese National Resistance Party, and as we previously said: where there is occupation there is resistance against occupation. We criticized the operation in its form and timing —not because the Zionist enemy needs a pretext to continue its aggression, which did not stop originally, but because the operation was not directed against the occupation. Thus, the Lebanese national cause was obscured, and the political objective required from the operation —imposing the withd rawal of enemy forces from the occupied Lebanese territories up to the armistice line without condition —was not defined, nor was there a response to its aggressions committed throughout 15 months.
At the same time, we confirm that the main battle remains with its compass directed against the occupation.

1- Position of the Lebanese Communist Party:
In facing this comprehensive aggressive project, our party held the American administration and the Zionist entity responsible for the dangerous escalation on Lebanon, and renewed its demand to the Lebanese government to assume its responsibilities in conf ronting the Zionist enemy, confirming the party’s national constants regarding our people’s right to resist the occupation by all available means, and stressing the importance of the steadfastness of our people in the Suburb, the South, the Bekaa, and all targeted areas.
The party also confirmed its full standing beside the forcibly displaced, and called for the widest solidarity campaign to assist them and strengthen their steadfastness, urging communist parties, forces of the left and progress, and fighters of the world to organize the widest campaigns of political and popular support to pressure their governments to stop the Zionist war machine and to boycott the Zionist entity politically and economically.
With the transformation of the Zionist escalation into a ground invasion south of the Litani, the party held those in charge of the constitutional state institutions, with their parties and political forces participating in the quota system, responsible fo r not uniting the Lebanese across their affiliations and intellectual sources in order to: stop the Zionist aggression and impose the withdrawal of its forces from all Lebanese occupied territories up to the armistice line without condition, return the peo ple to their areas and homes, reconstruction, and release the prisoners.
This should be simultaneous with presenting a national position regarding the displaced issue around which the Lebanese unite in facing the Zionist aggression, dropping attempts of se curity tension, preserving civil peace, and confirming the responsibility of the state in facing the aggression, and the right of the Lebanese people to resist as long as there is occupation.
With regard to the sessions of direct negotiations at the ambassadorial level in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Washington, the party announced its prior position by affirming that the priority begins with a ceasefire before anything else and rejecting  direct political negotiations with “Israel.” This specifically means refusing to enter negotiations under “Israeli” conditions aimed at achieving “peace” with Lebanon and disarming the resistance, as well as rejecting American sponsorship of the talks, si nce the United States is a party to the aggression against Lebanon and the region and an ally of the enemy. Concerning the initiative of the President of the Republic to conduct direct negotiations with the “Israeli” enemy, the party stressed that Lebanon’ s interest lies in negotiations confined solely to security matters, abandoning illusions of “peace” with the expansionist Zionist entity, which is driven by religious delusions, geographic expansion, economic control, and the establishment of a regional i mperialism masked by the Abraham Accords. As for the issue of “disarming Hezbollah,” the party emphasized that before defining its position it is important to recall basic facts: the Lebanese Communist Party was the first to launch national resistance agai nst the “Israeli” occupation, paying a heavy price in blood over decades of attempts to remove it from the arena; it consistently sought to give the resistance a national rather than sectarian character, to prevent it from serving external or regional inte rests, to link liberation from occupation with political and social change and the building of a secular, non‑sectarian state, and to create an armed resistance open to all who wished to participate without monopoly or coercion. Based on these firm positions, the party believes that the proper approach to the resistance issue is a political one, open to reforming the foundations of the state and gradually freeing it from class constraints and sectarian legacies, while emphasizing the arming and equipping of  the army and imposing compulsory civil and military service on all Lebanese at a certain age to foster integration and cohesion. Any approach to the future of armed resistance must be embraced within a national defense project, in implementation of the Ta if Agreement, especially its provisions that free the country from political sectarianism and make the state stronger than all sects.
 

2. Displacement: A National and Social Issue:
On the issue of displacement and the requirements of popular resilience, the party revived the Popular Resilience Committee that it had established during the 2023 –2024 aggression, seeking as much as possible to ease the burdens on our forcibly displaced p eople, especially on the families of the party and its friends. The party emphasized intensifying relief efforts for the displaced, providing shelter, and everything required within a national plan based on the principle of social solidarity and mutual sup port, with the state mobilizing its own treasury resources while awaiting the arrival of external aid, and with a commitment to deliver assistance directly to the displaced and remove it from the corruption system rooted in sectarian quota‑sharing among ruling parties. In this regard, the party stressed the need to prepare detailed, individual, and comprehensive statistical files on all types of human, material, and
housing losses caused by the Zionist aggression against Lebanon, so that they may be submitted as documented files to the relevant international bodies in order to obtain compensation for affected Lebanese and oblige the aggressor to pay them in accordance  with the principles of international law. Accordingly, it is necessary to strengthen communication with the displaced, organize regular meetings with them, coordinate with municipalities, associations, and civil organizations, and follow up their cause in  all Lebanese international, official, and popular forums and institutions for the sake of return, reconstruction, and all other needs of relief and shelter.
 

3. Direct Negotiations Before Ceasefire and the Declaration of the “Understanding Statement”:
With the announcement of the agreement to halt the American aggression against Iran, the Zionist enemy committed an unprecedented massacre in Beirut, its southern suburbs, and other areas, killing more than 350 martyrs and injuring a thousand people in les s than fifteen minutes, most of them civilians of all categories and ages. The level of lies and boasting by “Israeli” leaders reached the point of claiming that their forces had killed hundreds of Hezbollah cadres in that massacre, while Lebanese, Arab, a nd international media broadcast images of hundreds of civilian victims, especially women, children, and the elderly. The Communist Party welcomed the agreement to stop the aggression against Iran and stressed the necessity of halting the Zionist aggressio n against Lebanon as well. In contrast, the Lebanese authorities, as before, took the position of receiver of American conditions and pressures by begging for direct negotiations with the enemy, while it continued to ignore them and pursue its massacres to  this day amid a dangerous internal division.
Although the Zionist occupation forces advanced in the south, this advance occurred very slowly and faced fierce resistance by heroic fighters over sixty days, during which they inflicted heavy losses on the invading forces, sacrificing their lives in defe nse of the land of the south and all of Lebanon. With the start of direct negotiations under fire in Washington between Lebanon and the Zionist enemy on April 14 and the declaration of the “Understanding Statement” with the signing of the ceasefire agreeme nt on April 16, 2026, official Lebanon practically entered the path of direct political normalization with the Zionist enemy. This reflects a political shift that — according to the statement —aims to prepare favorable conditions for establishing permanent “peace,” full recognition of each other’s sovereignty, and maintaining “Israel’s” right to “self‑defense. ” Afterwards, “Israel ” rushed to announce what it calls the yellow line extending from Naqoura westward to the town of Khiam eastward, ten kilometers dee p (about fifty ‑five towns), simultaneously destroying the towns and villages of the strip and displacing its inhabitants (around 100,000 people) under the pretext of creating a so ‑called safe zone, while retaining throughout the occupation the right to take all necessary measures against any planned, imminent, or ongoing attacks —without granting Lebanon reciprocal rights. This allows it, especially in the area between the yellow line and the Litani River, to continue its assaults by
land and air, killing and displacing thousands of residents and devastating villages and towns. The agreement also stipulated that “Israel” and Lebanon request the United States to facilitate additional direct negotiations covering outstanding issues, incl uding the demarcation of international land borders, leading to a comprehensive and lasting agreement. The ceasefire agreement was approved by Presidents Aoun, Salam, and Berri, and welcomed by Saudi Arabia, Iran, France, Pakistan, and many other countries , while Hezbollah accepted it cautiously, hinting at responding to “Israeli” violations if they occur. Yet with the President’s tense speech on the ceasefire agreement, fears and anxieties grew that the internal situation might move toward greater tension,  influenced by the direct repercussions of any potential agreement between Trump and Iran on Lebanon. In this context, the party finds it important to recall that our resistant stance against the normalization path —which began with the maritime border dema rcation agreement, continued with the mechanism committee and the appointment of Ambassador Simon Karam —is today reaffirmed with the same position on the ceasefire agreement. The Washington meeting took place under fire, in a humiliating manner unworthy of  our people’s sacrifices and martyrs’ blood, within a balance of power tilted toward the Zionist enemy.
In short, the Lebanese government dealt with the issue of negotiations with “Israel” with a certain arrogance, as if this negotiation were merely a purely executive procedure. It did not seek, before entering negotiations, to prepare and establish grassroo ts frameworks for building internal political consensus by gathering a spectrum of political forces representing public opinion and consulting them on the negotiation clauses. It is not unlikely that the government rushed in reading the results of the Amer ican‑“Israeli ” war on Iran, assuming that the latter had suffered a complete defeat. This likely explains its haste in declaring the delegitimization of Hezbollah’s weapons and its ease in “demonizing” the relationship with Iran. Events have shown that Iran is an influe ntial force in the balances and equations of the Middle East, and it would have been more appropriate for the Lebanese government to try to extract negotiating leverage instead of scrambling to please Washington and “Israel.”
 

4. On the Possibility of Syria Entering Lebanon:
Advice was given to Syria to prioritize preserving its internal stability, integrating into the Arab system, and contributing to containing Iran, rather than plunging itself into risky military adventures confronting its axis in Lebanon and Iraq. Syrian in tervention in Lebanon would likely trigger the involvement of Iran’s allies in Iraq and Yemen on the Syrian front, and such intervention could also push Lebanon toward sectarian strife, undermining the legitimacy of the state and producing counterproductiv e results. Moreover, Turkey —the main supporter of the Syrian regime —now stands alongside Iran in its war with “Israel,” fearing the expansion of the “Israeli” role and its ability to achieve regional dominance that threatens Turkish interests themselves. T urkey has therefore worked to neutralize the Syrian regime from the battle and
from any military confrontation with Hezbollah. To prevent the war from spilling into its territory, Syria reinforced its presence along the eastern border with Lebanon, seeking to control population movements and continue strengthening its general Arab po sitioning aimed at containing Iran and its allies in the region. It should be noted that Syria is already suffering from a suffocating economic crisis due to the continued rise in prices, the collapse of the currency exchange rate, the evaporation of the r eal value of bank deposits, and the compounded effects of the energy crisis. Added to this is the entry of about 125,000 Syrian refugees from Lebanon into Syria, fleeing the war in Lebanon, and certainly accommodating them requires significant financial, h uman, and logistical resources. Yet all these considerations do not provide sufficient guarantees for Lebanon regarding the continuation of calm and security on the eastern border, especially if Arab or regional parties decide to tamper with this file for purposes related to the evolving multi ‑party conflict in the region.
 

5. Intensification of Division and Risks of Conflict Spilling into the Streets:
With ongoing attempts to obscure the reality of the internal political conflict by giving it a sectarian and denominational character, as happened with previous Lebanese governments, the risks of it spilling into the streets have increased, turning into st rife that serves only the Zionist enemy, which seeks to exploit it in its long ‑term project of fragmenting the region ’s states and establishing a new Middle East in which “Greater Israel ” plays the central role. The ruling forces and their constitutional i nstitutions failed to find real solutions to the problems they claimed to address, implementing only a minimal portion of the reforms promised in the inaugural speech and ministerial statement. On top of that, new problems emerged that multiplied the gravi ty of the situation and deepened divisions during the aggression, particularly: the American ‑Zionist aggression against Iran; Hezbollah ’s military operation against “Israel ” after the assassination of Morshed (leader) Ali Khamenei; the President ’s initiative calling for direct negotiations with the Zionist entity (including in one of its four points the control of armed forces over tension areas, confiscation of weapons there, and seizure of Hezbollah’s arms, depots, and warehouses according to av ailable information); the banning of Hezbollah’s weapons, declaring them illegal, and lifting political cover by sending a memorandum to the UN Secretary ‑General and Security Council; the decision to expel the Iranian ambassador from Lebanon and declare hi m persona non grata; Iran’s inclusion of halting aggression against Hezbollah among the ten negotiation points proposed, which Trump agreed to but President Aoun rejected on the grounds that only the Lebanese state negotiates for Lebanon; the government’s decision to make Beirut a demilitarized zone and task the Lebanese army and security agencies with implementing it; Netanyahu’s response by agreeing to start direct negotiations at the ambassadorial level under American sponsorship in Washington before ann ouncing the cessation of aggression against Lebanon, in appreciation of the Lebanese government’s position on demilitarizing Beirut. All these issues reveal the extent of the political system’s crisis, its fragility, and its historical
tendency to shift from one guardianship to another —at times French, Syrian, or Egyptian, and at other times Saudi or Iranian —culminating in the current stage open to American tutelage accompanied by normalization with “Israel.” While Netanyahu insists on s eparating negotiations on Lebanon from those with Iran (regardless of the outcome of U.S. –Iran negotiations), President Aoun declared in a cabinet session that no party may negotiate on behalf of Lebanon except the Lebanese state, based on his four ‑point i nitiative: establishing a complete truce to stop “Israeli ” attacks on Lebanon - providing necessary logistical support to Lebanese armed forces - ensuring armed forces control tension areas and confiscate weapons there, including Hezbollah ’s arms, depots, and warehouses according to provided information - beginning simultaneous direct negotiations between Lebanon and “Israel” under American sponsorship to implement all the above. In the same context, the cabinet decided to declare Beirut a de militarized zone a nd tasked the army and security agencies with enforcing this decision. Our party considered that this decision deepens political division along regional, sectarian, and constitutional lines. Netanyahu praised Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s stance on this mat ter, announcing readiness to open direct negotiations with Lebanon on disarming Hezbollah and establishing “peace” with Lebanon. These developments raise thorny, even existential questions: What Lebanon is intended to emerge from this war and these negotia tions? Lebanon with its amputated south? Lebanon with its devastated suburb? Lebanon with its threatened Bekaa? Lebanon exhausted by its permanent and escalating divisions? The most dangerous thing Lebanese can do today is adapt to the reality instead of c hanging it.
 

6. The Danger of Internal S trife and the Urgent Need to Bury It:
In light of historical experience, the eruption of Lebanon’s political system crisis often coincides with the conflict taking a military form that quickly assumes a sectarian and denominational character. While the elements of strife are many, they are fed  primarily by the sectarian political system, its dependency, and the subordination of ruling factions to their patrons. Manifestations include the deep disagreement among Lebanese over Hezbollah’s weapons and the army’s role in removing them, disputes ove r funding for reconstruction of what the Zionist aggression destroyed, the Maarab meeting’s call for an international tribunal to prosecute Hezbollah officials and for international forces under Chapter Seven, and, in contrast, there also emerged the langu age of treason ‑accusation and threats from leaders, media figures, and activists from the side of Hezbollah, about pouncing on the interior and overturning the table on others after the end of the aggression. The sedition is also nourished by “Israel ’s” co nfirmed and historical betting on investing in this disagreement and escalating it to achieve the goals of its expansionist project in the medium term, including using internal sedition as a tool to uproot Iranian influence in Lebanon. What raises fears in  this context is the worsening of the problem of internal displacement because of the aggression and what results from it of demographic change, and the emergence of objection to receiving the displaced and housing them in some areas contrary
to the constitution, simultaneously with the rise of sectarian squares and armed checkpoints of power‑holders subject to the occupation in some villages of the border strip. It suffices “Israel” to turn displacement into a material of fear, fear into a material of division, and division into fighting and sedition. The burying of sedition requires urgently building a Lebanese ‑Lebanese understanding around addressing the roots of the crisis, in which everyone participates. For the homeland as a whole is targe ted, not the South alone. The ruling forces in all their sides bear full responsibility for bringing the country to this level of weakness and humiliation, as they made it exposed to political and sectarian division and to economic and social collapse, and  a field for impoverishment, migration, and displacement. The priority for all Lebanese is the rejection of sectarian, inciting, and treason ‑accusing discourse from all sides, whether in the street, the media, or social media, and producing a national cons ensus on the narrative that the most important requirement to confront the hostile “Israeli” ambitions and projects lies in actually starting now to implement the reform items of the Taif Agreement, leading to the establishment of the secular democratic re sisting state.

Political Bureau of the Lebanese Communist Party May 6, 2026